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OF FAMILY VALUES AND CHILD
WELFARE: WHAT IS IN THE "BEST"
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD?
JAMES DONALD MOOREHEAD*
[T]he people deciding which families to preserve have no idea
what they're doing.'
INTRODUCTION
Baby J was born prematurely to a woman addicted to crack cocaine.
The mother's three other children had been removed from her custody
and placed with their natural father. Baby J's natural father could not
be identified, however, and state social service officials made the
decision to place Baby J in a foster home. Her new "foster mother"
held a Ph.D. in education and was a member of the local town council.
When the child's natural mother failed repeated attempts to overcome
drug addiction, Baby J's foster parents' hope of adopting the child grew
stronger.
Then, without warning, after the foster parents had spent almost two
years caring for Baby J, a cousin of the child's natural mother came
forward and sought custody. On the recommendation of state officials,
and against the wishes of the foster mother (who, for a short time, hid
the child from authorities), Baby J was sent to live with her natural
family. An article in the New York Times gave the following account
of the debate surrounding Baby J and the much larger debate that
permeates modern child welfare decision-making:
Custodial disputes between foster parents and relatives are
common... and the relatives usually win out on the strength of
blood. Some argue, however, that in certain cases the children
are better off staying in the foster home even when there are
family members who want them.
* J.D., 1994, Yale Law School; Attorney, Bredhoff & Kaiser, P.L.L.C., Washington, D.C.
For their guidance and encouragement, the author would like to thank Professor Robert A.
Burt, Southmayd Professor of Law at Yale Law School and Professor Faust F. Rossi, Samuel
S. Leibowitz Professor of Trial Techniques at Cornell Law School. The opinions expressed
in this Article are, of course, the author's own.
1. Michael Grunwald, Abuse Shows Danger of Birth-Family Bias, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan.
27, 1996, at Al, A12 (quoting Dr. Charles Welch, psychiatrist at Massachusetts General
Hospital).
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"Any time you move the child, you damage the child," said
Mary Beth Style, a vice president of the National Council for
Adoption .... "What a lot of us are saying is that you ought to
look at the impact on the child."
[Anita M.] Bock, of the rehabilitative services department,
said she thought that placing Baby J with relatives was in the
girl's best interest because it would have been more traumatic for
the child to have been cut off from family members for whom
she would eventually have searched .... "We would have been
postponing the trauma this child would have gone through," Ms.
Bock said. "When children get older, they want to know."
Many advocates agree with the emphasis on reunification.
"Kids really belong with the family first," said [Carole]
Shauffer of the Youth Law Center. "We don't want to redistrib-
ute children."
But many fear psychological harm to the children when they
are taken from the only family they have known for years.2
The case of Baby J raises questions of great consequence. How
should society respond when one of its children is identified as a victim
of parental abuse or neglect? Do we quickly remove the child from an
abusive or neglectful situation and place the child in foster care? Should
we place the child in an orphanage to stop the abuse (an idea popular,
for very different reasons, with House Speaker Gingrich)? Should we
terminate parental rights and encourage adoption? Or should we have
a bias in favor of maintaining a child's contact with the family of origin,
even to the point of leaving the child in a potentially harmful environ-
ment? Should the rights of the family ever outweigh the welfare of the
child?
The debate surrounding these questions first became heated in 1975,
when Professor Michael Wald proposed a controversial policy of keeping
the abused/neglected child in the parental home in all but the most
dangerous of circumstances.3 This leading article was followed in 1977
by the Juvenile Justice Standards Project-Standards Relating to Abuse
and Neglect, co-reported by Wald and Professor Robert Burt, which
sought to codify many of Wald's earlier views.4 The movement was
2. Mireya Navarro, Battle for Baby J: Foster Mother Fights Family for Permanent
Custody, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1995, at A7.
3. Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for
Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1975).
4. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION & THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT
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advanced in 1979 by Professors Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and
Albert Solnit,5 who expanded their earlier bias for "minimum state
intervention" in the case of parental child custody disputes6 to include
those situations where parental abuse and neglect are discovered outside
the context of a custody proceeding. The writings of Wald, Burt, and
the Goldstein group were widely discussed and debated in scholarly
circles. The views of these "minimum state interventionists" were
philosophically grounded in the fields of social science and child
psychology, and as such, they appeared to be reliable and authoritative.
As a result, the "least detrimental alternative" model, with its emphasis
on family privacy and autonomy, became an influential force in shaping
judicial and legislative decisions regarding the public response to child
abuse.7
In recent years, the tide has turned somewhat, and the public
perception of the problem has returned to a more interventionist bias.
Child advocates and scholars such as Douglas Besharov, Patrick Murphy,
and David Herring have refuted the arguments of Wald and the
Goldstein group, and have encouraged a more activist state response to
child abuse and neglect. And at least one scholar, who initially
appeared to support the minimum state intervention theory, has revised
her views and now encourages an activist approach.'
(1977) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]. These standards were not adopted.
5. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979)
[hereinafter GOLDSTEIN 1979].
6. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973)
[hereinafter GOLDSTEIN 1973].
7. See generally Peggy C. Davis, Law, Science, and History: Reflections Upon In the Best
Interests of the Child, 86 MIcH. L. REv. 1096, 1096 (1988):
In the legal context, the authors' goal has been "to provide a basis for critically
evaluating and revising [consistently with their beliefs about psychological
parenthood] the procedure and substance of court decisions, as well as statutes." In
this, they have had notable success. The theories and recommendations of these
scholars have stimulated a significant, albeit incomplete, restructuring of statutes and
common law governing child placement decisionmaking.
(citations omitted).
8. Compare Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REv. 423,
425 (1983) (arguing that "[t]ermination of [parental] rights should be ordered only after a
judicial finding that the child will otherwise suffer specific, significant harm and that any
alternative short of termination will not avert that harm"), with Marsha Garrison, Child
Welfare Decisionmaking: In Search of the Least Drastic Alternative, 75 GEO. L.J. 1745, 1780
(1987) (arguing for broad statutory definitions of abuse and neglect, and stating that
"separation from a disturbed home, which produces an improvement in the child's care, is
often preferable to a child's remaining in the disturbed environment").
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Research for this Article was initiated for the purpose of discovering
the reasons underlying this shift in opinion. It was suspected that new,
significant empirical data had surfaced that would question the theories
of the minimum state interventionists. This proved not to be the case.
Although scholars on both sides of the argument seem to have rational
reasons for their position, and each side supports its prescription for
appropriate child welfare standards with general pronouncements of
what truly benefits the child in the long term, the evidence in favor of
either position falls far short of being persuasive. Upon consideration
of the contrasting arguments, one is struck by the lack of persuasive
empirical data supporting either position. True, there exist ample data
on the deleterious effects of long-term foster care placement,9 and, as
will be discussed, at least one study has attempted to compare children
in foster placement with those who are left in a highly state-supported
and monitored parental home environment. However, these studies fail
to address one of the central tenets of the minimum state intervention
theorists-that the state must refrain from any contact with a family
where the environment is not so abusive or neglectful as to warrant
removal of the child. As will be discussed, Wald and the Goldstein
group maintain that the mere presence of the state in family life disrupts
the child's sense of normalcy and security. Therefore, the question
becomes, "Is it possible to gather data that will adequately compare the
minimum state intervention model, in its purest form, with the bias in
favor of removal?" And if this question is answered in the negative, we
must then ask, "How do we go about making our policy decisions in the
light of inherently inadequate data?"
This Article attempts to answer both questions. Part I of the Article
provides an overview of those scholars who argue in favor of minimum
state intervention and those who are in favor of a more activist state
approach. Specifically, this Part exposes the lack of empirical data
supporting either of these views. Part II of the Article examines one
group's attempt to design an effective empirical study and the shortcom-
ings of their methodology. This Part discusses the problems inherent in
any collection of influential data. Part III of the Article proposes a way
in which public policy should be shaped in light of the problems with
empirical data gathering.1"
9. Even this assumption, however, is not without its detractors. See, e.g., Garrison, Child
Welfare Decisionmaking, supra note 8.
10. The continuing support for our flawed system of child welfare decisionmaking is
illustrated in a recent article from The Boston Globe, which describes the concern held by
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I. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST INTERVENTION
A. The Minimum State Interventionists
1. The 1975 Wald Article
The principle of minimum state intervention tends to rest on a
support for family autonomy and privacy, and as a result, those who
argue for such autonomy find it necessary to espouse a correspondingly
narrow definition of parental abuse and neglect. Michael Wald's
ground-breaking article set the stage for this model:
I submit that a narrowing of neglect jurisdiction is needed. The
sympathetic appeal of beaten, malnourished, or helpless children
is a strong inducement for expanded intervention. However,
because legislators and judges presume the beneficence of such
intervention, there is great temptation to intervene too often, and
restraints placed on the exercise of coercive state power else-
where are minimized or disregarded in the child neglect area."
Wald bases his call for a narrowing of neglect definitions and a
corresponding removal of state intervention on empirical data exposing'
the risks inherent in foster care placement.'2  However, Wald himself
admits that:
[s]ince no studies exist comparing children placed in foster care
with a matched sample of children left in their own homes under
conditions that led to the removal of the first group, it cannot be
conclusively said how many, if any, minors are "worse off" as a
result of foster-care placement. 3
many professionals that "the history of family preservation has created an increased risk for
children." See Grunwald, supra note 1, at A12. These professionals suggest that this risk
arises, not from the indeterminacy underlying the normative assumptions of the decision-
making process, but from the ineptitude of individuals selected to apply those normative as-
sumptions and make child placement decisions. According to the Globe article, "[m]any
clinicians say the way to avoid ... disasters [of child abuse, neglect, and even death] is not
to abandon family preservation, or to adopt it in all cases, but to ensure that trained
professionals decide which families can be saved." Id. (emphasis added). This Article argues
that such ideas are pure fantasy and that even "trained professionals" are presently
unequipped to make sound child placement decisions.
11. Wald, supra note 3, at 987.
12. Ik at 993-95.
13. Id. at 995. Interestingly, Wald speculates that "[f]ew judges or social workers are
willing to risk such experiments, perhaps with good reason." Id. at 996. As will be discussed
in Part II of this Article, however, Wald himself designed and conducted such a study in the
late 1970s and early 1980s.
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Furthermore, and more significant for this discussion of the problems of
empirical testing of the theories of Wald and the other minimum state
interventionists, Wald goes on to question even those intervention
programs that do not remove the child from the parental home. Relying
upon the earlier work of the Goldstein group in the area of child
custody disputes, Wald argues that "[t]he presence of a caseworker
supervising parental behavior can interfere with the psychological system
of the family."14 Wald finds even these supportive roles, when imposed
by the state (rather than offered on a voluntary basis), to be inherently
coercive.15
Wald proposes a new standard for parental abuse and neglect that
is significantly narrower than the prevailing standard. He maintains that
the focus of the state inquiry should shift from the gravity of the
parental behavior to the gravity of the harm inflicted upon the child.
Wald's proposal for physical abuse standards is representative of his
philosophy:
Except in cases where the beatings are so severe that death or
maiming is likely to occur, it is difficult to predict the long-term
negative consequences for the child that might be associated with
having been abused....
There is no reason why children should suffer the short-term
pain, trauma, and danger caused by severe beatings. However,
it is necessary to consider the resultant harms if the child can be
protected only by removing him from the family.16
14. Id. at 999.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1010-11 (emphasis added). Again, it should be noted that Wald argues not
only that removal from the family harms the child, but also that intervention in the family
system is itself harmful. Furthermore, it is of interest to note that Wald carries his narrow
definition of abuse into other areas, including child sexual abuse:
[D]espite an abundance of theoretical material about the harm of sexual activity
within the family, there are very few studies demonstrating the negative impact of
sexual "abuse." The damage, if there is any, is usually emotional and the symptoms
may not be manifest....
In addition, any intervention, insofar as it requires the child to tell his or her
story to the police, welfare workers, and court, may cause more trauma than
parental behavior.
Id. at 1024-25 (citations omitted).
Thus, Wald shows a reluctance to rely upon "theoretical material" which fails to support his
suppositions about human behavior, yet he is a proponent of theoretical material that supports
his views. Wald ultimately argues that due to the unlikelihood that states will revoke criminal
penalties for child sexual abuse (a revocation which he supports), the state should intervene
upon a finding of "sexual abuse"-a term which he admits a reluctance to define. Id. at 1024-
27.
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It is this belief that the "resultant harms" from state intervention
outweigh the harm from parental abuse that characterizes Wald (and the
Goldstein group), and it is this belief that is asserted without the support
of any empirical data.
2. The Juvenile Justice Standards Project
Many of Wald's views regarding the importance of family autonomy,
the virtues of limited state intervention, and the necessity of continuity
and stability in the family system were included in a project of the
American Bar Association that sought to provide a codification of
juvenile justice standards. Wald and his co-reporter, Robert Burt,
drafted a comprehensive model for child abuse and neglect standards
that drew heavily upon the existing literature, including the first work of
the Goldstein group.
Like the earlier Wald article, these standards rest upon the baseline
assumption that "coercive intervention can be harmful to children as
well as helpful."' 8 Specifically, the commentary to the standards relies,
in part, upon the data regarding the negative effects of child foster care
placement. Because psychological research indicates that children
function best in a stable family situation, and because the very nature of
the foster care system has proved harmful to children, Professors Burt
and Wald developed a standard that:
reflects the judgment that coercive intervention is not appropriate
merely because a child is being "harmed," regardless of the
nature of the harm. It is further a rejection of the claim that the
goal of state intervention should be to protect a child from a
home environment which is not "optimal" for the child. Instead
it calls for a statutory definition which limits intervention to
situations involving "serious" harm.
The commentary to the proposed ABA standards contains the
explicit assertion that in all but the most severe cases, retention of the
child in the parental home is preferable.' ° Again, this belief is ground-
ed in literature that points to the great problems in the foster care
system. However, the commentary goes on to assert that "[r]emoving
a child from his/her family may cause serious psychological dam-
age-damage more serious than the harm intervention is supposed to
17. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4 at 26.
18. Id. at 40-41.
19. Id. at 42.
20. Id.
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prevent.''21 It is this assertion that, although it finds some support in
Wald's later study, discussed infra, was unsupported at the time of
drafting by any specific empirical research.
The Abuse and Neglect standards reflect a clear bias against state
coercive action in all but the most serious cases of child mistreatment.
Although not as explicit as the earlier Wald article, this bias seems to
stand for the proposition that any state involvement in the family is
disruptive to family harmony and childhood development. The
standards contain no "sliding scale" of harm that might provide certain
limited intervention (for instance, periodic social worker visits) in the
case of less than serious harm. As discussed in relation to the Wald
article, and as will be seen in the discussion of the Goldstein group's
second work, it is this assumption regarding the harms inherent in
minimal state contact with the family unit that is wholly unsupported by
empirical data, and that may be difficult to test even under optimal
conditions.22
3. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit
In many ways, the works of Wald, Burt, and the Goldstein group
resemble each other. Wald based his 1975 article on the Goldstein
group's premise that a child's need for stability was paramount.' Wald
notes that the Goldstein group's initial work on child custody disputes
had been interpreted by some as support for broader abuse and neglect
statutes and expansive state intervention (to place the child in a
nurturing environment).24  But as Wald correctly predicted, the
Goldstein group's next work implicitly supported his call for limited
state intervention in abuse and neglect cases.25
Like Wald and Burt, the Goldstein group sets forth narrow
definitions for abuse and neglect. For instance, the group proposes that
state intervention be tolerated only in the case of "serious bodily
injury," protecting children "who are brutally kicked, beaten, or attacked
by their parents ... [or] whose parents may have attempted to injure
21. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
22. In interviews with the author of this Article, Professor Burt stated that at the time
of the drafting of the ABA standards, he was reluctant to support this extreme view of the
harms created by all minimal state contacts with the family (for instance, intervention in the
form of non-threatening home visits).
23. Wald, supra note 3, at 987.
24. Id. at 987 n. 11.
25. Id.
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them, for example, by starvation, poisoning, or strangling."2 6 In the
realm of child sexual abuse, the Goldstein group gives an even narrower
definition than Wald and the ABA standards:27
When suspicion is aroused, the harm done by inquiry may be
more than that caused by not intruding. The harm already
inflicted upon the child-and it may be difficult to learn its
extent-is aggravated by violations of family integrity, particular-
ly by the investigation that is triggered .... For these reasons,
justification for separating the child and offending parent seems
best left to the criminal law-to its high standard of evidentiary
proof and its goal of reinforcing society's moral position.'
The emphasis on "harm done" by the very act of inquiry on the part
of the state is a recurring theme in the Goldstein group's discourse.
According to this expansive concept, "[w]hen child protective services,
for example, invoke the process by making inquiry about a particular
child or family, the state intrudes."'29 To protect the child from the
harms caused by this "undermin[ing] ... of parental authority,""° it is
necessary for the Goldstein group to propose their extremely narrow
definitions of abuse and neglect. The relationship between the statutory
definition (which serves to authorize coercion) and the theory that "any
interference"3 is detrimental to the child is summarized by the
Goldstein group: "We urge, therefore, that at no stage should intrusion
on any family be authorized unless probable and sufficient cause for the
coercive action has been established in accord with limits prospectively
and precisely defined by the legislature."3  Because "intrusion" is
synonymous with any state action that cannot be supported by the
narrow statutory definition, the family is essentially protected from the
inquiry of social workers and other state authorities in all but the most
abusive or neglectful situations.
The Goldstein group relies exclusively on psychological literature,
including studies of how children react to displacement from family and
the erosion of parental authority. However, this influential work is not
26. GOLDSTEIN 1979, supra note 5 at 72.
27. Section 2.1(D) of the ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, states that courts should
assume jurisdiction when "a child has been sexually abused by his/her parent or a member
of his/her household (alternative: ... and is seriously harmed physically or emotionally
thereby)."
28. GOLDSTEIN 1979, supra note 5, at 64 (citations omitted).
29. Id. at 23.
30. Id. at 24.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 25.
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based on any empirical data that would support the baseline assumptions
made by the authors.33 Interestingly, the Goldstein group wholly
ignored the existing body of empirical studies that questioned the foster
care system and inherently supported the group's theories.
As with the Wald article, however, it is the Goldstein group's
support for minimal state inquiry into only those cases of "serious"
injury that exposes not only a lack of current empirical grounding, but
also points to an even more significant problem in the development of
such studies. As discussed in Part II of this Article, Wald has shown
that it is possible to compare (on a limited basis) foster care placement
and intensive in-home interventions. However, the reluctance of the
Goldstein group to authorize any contact with a family whose dysfunc-
tion is not severe enough to warrant full-blown state intervention
presents a dilemma in the acquisition of supporting empirical data.
B. Interventionist Arguments
1. Child Public Advocates
In recent years, advocates for child welfare intervention have become
more vocal, and the public outcry for governmental action in this area
appears to be on the increase. For instance, Cook County (Illinois)
Public Guardian Patrick Murphy has been an outspoken defender of the
rights of abused and neglected children, fighting against the reduction of
state intervention services34 and prosecuting particular offenders.35
Douglas Besharov, another staunch advocate for the rights of abused
children, has written several manuals and books on the recognition of
abuse and neglect.36 Besharov supports the current definitions of abuse
33. "This book's grounds for intervention and the guidelines in Beyond the Best Interests
of the Child incorporate principles of general application that have been distilled from
psychoanalytic theory and from an extensive body of diagnostic and therapeutic work in child
development." Id. at 228-29.
34. See, e.g., Rob Karwath, DCFS Plans to Farm Out Some Cases, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 21,
1992, at 3; Rob Karwath, Court Orders DCFS to New Plan of Action, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 21,
1991, at 5; Rob Karwath, Hearing Asked Before Kids Sent to Homer, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 27,
1991, at 4.
35. See, e.g., Rob Karwath, DCFS Worker Guilty of Contempt, CHI. TRIB., Sep. 25, 1991,
at 1.
36. DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT REPORTING AND
INVESTIGATION: POLICY GUIDELINES FOR DECISION MAKING 6 (1988) (stating that "[s]ociety,
however, does not wait until a child is seriously injured before taking protective action. The
purpose of child protective intervention is also to protect children from future injury");
DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV, CHILD ABUSE: A POLICE GUIDE (1987); DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV,
RECOGNIZING CHILD ABUSE: A GUIDE FOR THE CONCERNED (1990).
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and neglect, and his philosophical differences with the minimum
interventionists is evident in his writings:
Children who live through years of assault, degradation, and
neglect bear emotional scars that can last for years. We all pay
the price of their suffering. Maltreated children often grow up
to vent on their own children-and others-the violence and
aggression their parents visited on them. ... Even when
maltreated children do not become violent or socially destructive
adults, they may have emotional deficits and learning problems
that make them a continuing burden on a community's welfare,
social service, and mental health systems.37
Neither of these representative advocates, however, provides a
systematic explanation for their belief in significant intervention.
Whether the impetus for their beliefs is public outcry, an impression that
abuse and neglect are on the rise, or a general internal sense that
intervention is the best solution, we are left to speculate. For a better
comparison to the tenets of the minimum interventionists, we must look
at the arguments of academics who attempt to counter their assump-
tions.
2. The Garrison Article
Perhaps the best example of the arguments presented in favor of
greater state intervention is found in a 1987 article by Professor Marsha
Garrison.38 Garrison, a professor at Brooklyn Law School, had been
an advocate for the continuation of parental rights, even in cases where
removal from parental custody was necessary.39 Her 1987 article, while
not a direct refutation of her earlier work, displays a clear bias towards
state intervention. Indeed, her argument for broad abuse and neglect
definitions would seem to weaken the very parental rights for which she
had earlier argued.
Garrison is a harsh critic of the methodology of the Goldstein group,
identifying their studies as "an excellent example of cavalier and over-
optimistic analysis."'  In many ways, Garrison points to the concerns
raised in this article:
In order to evaluate the [Goldstein group's] proposal, it is
necessary first to assess carefully the risks of intervention in the
home and removal from it, and then to balance these risks
37. BESHAROV, RECOGNIZING CHILD ABUSE, supra note 36, at 2.
38. Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking, supra note 8.
39. Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, supra note 8.
40. 'Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking, supra note 8, at 1762.
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against the risks of nonintervention and the possible benefits of
intervention. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit not only fail to do
this; they also provide no evidence at all, other than vague
pronouncements on the tenets of psychoanalytic theory, in
support of their claims. They ignore the many studies of how
children fare in foster care, along with the evidence on the risks
of nonintervention and the benefits of state action. ... [T]hey
also ignore the problem of insufficient evidence .... "
In an attempt to highlight the problems with the Goldstein group's
work, Garrison gives a thorough recount of the available empirical data.
She begins by stating her view, not inconsistent with that of Goldstein
and his colleagues, that the "family law traditions" of "family autonomy,
privacy, and parental authority" provide the best guidance for our policy
decisions.42 While Garrison is quick to point out that these "traditions"
do not provide clear answers to tough policy choices,4 3 she argues that
such values should fill in the gaps of our empirical data.' With this in
mind, Garrison reviews the available studies.
Garrison begins her analysis with the caveat that "the available data
can produce only a vague design for the least drastic alternative ...
[and] much of the available data is highly flawed."'45 Specifically, she
points to the problems in predicting personality, the lack of data
addressing specific scenarios, and problems with experimental controls
(e.g., methodology and follow-up).
Garrison questions the assumptions made by the Goldstein group
regarding the negative effects of foster care and the benefits of
continuity within the family. She cites several studies which lead her to
the conclusion that "although the research data is not yet definitive,
separation from a disturbed home, which produces an improvement in
the child's care, is often preferable to a child's remaining in the
disturbed environment."4 6 To reach the conclusion that neglect is more
damaging than discontinuity,47 Garrison relies on several research
studies that provide indirect psychological support for her conclusion.
41. Id. at 1763.
42. Id. at 1768-69.
43. For instance, Garrison states that family law tradition supports a model of
intervention that is based on harm to the child, rather than parental misconduct. However,
as she notes, this support does not help to determine empirically just how much harm is
enough to be labeled 'serious' for statutory purposes. Id. at 1774.
44. Id. at 1769.
45. Id. at 1767.
46. Id. at 1780.
47. Id. at 1778.
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For instance, Garrison notes that one study has demonstrated that the
"failure to thrive" syndrome in infants is reported in families that remain
intact as well as in institutionalized children.48 She also points to
psychological research which suggests that children in homes with
marital conflict fare better after parental separation,49 and that the
adaptation of children discharged from institutions is dependent on the
quality of the new "family" arrangement."
Garrison's conclusions, like those of the Goldstein group, are based
primarily on broad, psychoanalytic studies of how very specific groups
of children react to various changes in environment. She points to no
empirical studies designed specifically to study the relative benefits and
harms of foster care versus family continuity.51 As such, Garrison's
arguments are essentially the converse of those made by the minimum
interventionists. While reaching the opposite conclusion, she also fails
to provide persuasive evidence. For instance, how do we know that
children react to parental separation in the same ways that they react to
child abuse? One is left with the impression that Garrison's beliefs, like
those of the Goldstein group, are based on little more than a patchwork
of vague psychological studies, with an attempt to mold the inconclusive
and perhaps irrelevant data into workable policy.
It would be unfair to portray Garrison as one who does not
recognize the conflicting nature of the available data. Unlike the
Goldstein group, she points to the collective limitations of the studies
and states that the process of child welfare decisionmaking is both
"elusive"52 and "indeterminate."53 Based on this recognition, Garrison
encourages us to find a middle ground for our policy.
In refuting the narrow definition of abuse and neglect proposed by
the minimum interventionists, she states that "at least based on the risks
children who receive child welfare services typically confront, and the
evidence regarding the risks of intervention, we cannot say that neglect
should be redefined to exclude large numbers of families currently
served by the child welfare system."'54 Garrison concludes:
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1778.
51. Garrison does point to the Wald study, discussed infra, but she does not use his data
regarding the sometimes positive effects of foster care placement.
52. Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking, supra note 8, at 1796.
53. Id. at 1774.
54. Id. at 1791-92.
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In view of the varied circumstances that can evidence a serious
risk to a child's well-being, and the concomitant difficulty of
formulating a precise definition of the circumstances in which
intervention is appropriate, I believe that a somewhat open-
ended definition of neglect, which relies on a broad array of
symptoms and measurements, is warranted....
3. The Herring Article
A 1992 article by Professor David Herring,5. a child advocate and
critic of the minimum intervention model, argues for the abolition of the
"reasonable efforts requirement" that is applicable when the state
attempts to terminate parental rights. Usually, such termination is
sought for the purpose of freeing the child for adoption-thereby
removing the child from the natural family and from the foster care
system.
To support his argument, Herring points to several sources, including
the 1975 Wald law review article, and new studies which support
Herring's belief that foster care is detrimental to children and that
adoption is the preferred means of solving the child abuse and neglect
dilemma. Curiously, Herring fails to mention the Wald empirical study,
discussed infra, and chooses instead to focus on a paragraph in the 1975
Wald article that is essentially a summary of the minimum intervention-
ists' opposition to foster care placement. As will be seen, Wald's later
empirical study questions these very assumptions about the deleterious
effects of foster care placement.
Apart from the Wald article, Herring points to three empirical
studies which seem to support his conclusion that adoption is a better
alternative than foster care placement, or, in the case of one study, is
also preferable to placement in the home of the natural mother. The
studies conclude that insecurity and low self-esteem, the inability to
adjust socially, and the rate of disturbance were ali greater in children
55. Id. at 1799. It is interesting to note the significant difference between Garrison's
"middle ground" approach, which encourages broad definitions of neglect and leans toward
overinclusiveness, and the Juvenile Justice Standards Project's "moderate" approach, which
proposes a narrower definition where "some children will be excluded who need protection."
ABA STANDARDS, supra, note 4 at 50. These differing opinions as to what constitutes the
"middle ground" and the "moderate" are a direct consequence of the authors' differing beliefs
in the problems associated with over-intervention by the state.
56. David J. Herring, Inclusion of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Termination
of Parental Rights Statutes: Punishing the Child for the Failures of the State Child Welfare
System, 54 U. PITr. L. REv. 139 (1992).
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placed in foster care. 7 With the exception of one study, which
determined that adoption was preferable to placement with the natural
mother, none of the studies compared foster care with retention in the
home. And even in the study that included natural mothers, the
children were simply "candidates for adoption." 8 Neither this study,
nor the other two cited by Herring, concerned abused and neglected
children. Each was based on children from disadvantaged families.
Despite the patent inconsistency between Herring's and Garrison's
selective interpretations of foster care data, Herring cites the Garrison
article as documenting "[t]he theoretical framework supporting the
argument that temporary foster care placements result in significant
harm to children ... ."" While it is true that Garrison outlines the
arguments of the minimum interventionists regarding the negative effects
of foster care, it should be made clear that Garrison is no supporter of
these views. Indeed, the comparison of the Garrison and Herring
articles demonstrates how two scholars, both of whom disagree with the
minimum interventionist theory, can interpret available data in such
disparate ways. Or perhaps it could be said that, rather than evidencing
a conflict in interpretation, the two articles demonstrate the willingness
of advocates of a certain position to highlight those studies that provide
support for their cause.
Whether the differences between Garrison and Herring are
differences of interpretation or differences attributable to a bias in
selecting data, these differences point to an ultimate problem in
interpreting any proffered data concerning the relative benefits of
removal from the home. Accurate interpretation of such data necessari-
ly rests on its c6mparison with data evaluating the risks of non-
intervention. This need for comparison of foster care families with
families in which the state has not intervened exposes the difficulty in
gathering such data, discussed further in Part II, infra-the inability to
determine accurately the harm caused or not caused by true non-
intervention on the part of the state. By definition, once a study is
designed to measure the effects on children who are placed in the home
of the natural parent, an outside group has interfered in the natural
processes of the family. According to the minimum interventionists,
such a disruption disturbs the child, exacerbating any sense of insecurity
that she may already feel, and is an unwarranted intrusion in all but the
57. Id. at 142.
58. Id. at 148.
59. Id at 144.
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most severe cases of abuse. Therefore, the interpretation of the scant
data we have appears to be a matter of speculation, and perhaps even
depends on one's initial bias. One thing seems clear from the compari-
son of Herring and Garrison, indeed, from an overview of the minimum
interventionist and their detractors: the data are inconclusive and
conflicting.
II. THE WALD STUDY AND EMPIRICAL UNCERTAINTY
From 1978 to 1982, Michael Wald conducted a study that sought to
test some of the assumptions of the minimum interventionists regarding
retention of children in the home of the natural parents.60 The study
was conducted by choosing two representative counties in California in
which a narrow definition of abuse and neglect would be instituted. In
these two counties, only the most serious cases of abuse and neglect
would result in foster care placement. Those children who remained in
the home, and who would otherwise have been eligible for removal
under the general state guidelines, were provided (along with their
families) extensive state services. Significant funds for these in-home
interventions were allocated by the same legislation that established the
test counties. In the remaining counties of California, the broad
statutory definitions of abuse and neglect remained, and the guidelines
for removal were unchanged.61 It was these two groups of children, the
two-county group and the remaining statewide group, who were
compared with each other.
As the authors of the Wald study admit, the findings are inconclu-
sive, and it is difficult to draw broad policy inferences even from this
detailed, well-funded study.62 Despite its shortcomings, the study
concludes that "there was not a great deal of difference between home
and foster care.'' 63 Nevertheless, the authors make it clear in their
summary analysis that foster care was the preferred placement. For
instance, in relation to the home group, the study states that "home
placement, even with services to the family, did not help the children
overcome their academic, emotional, and social problems."' As for
the other group of children, the study found the following:
60. MICHAEL S. WALD, ET AL., PROTECTING ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN
(1988).
61. I& at 3-4.
62. Id. at 181-82.
63. Id. at 183.
64. Id. at 184.
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The outcomes for the foster children were somewhat more
favorable, at least for the white children. It seems clear from our
data, which are consistent with the findings of [various studies]
... that foster care was not detrimental to most children. All but
two children were protected from further abuse or physical neglect.
There was no area of development ... where the white foster
children, as a group, appeared worse off at the end than initial-
ly.65
As for black children, the study found that they were no worse off in
foster care than they were at home. Thus, the study concluded, at least
on the basis of this empirical data, that:
[A]Ithough there was relatively little major change among the
children in either group, there is some indication that foster care
was more beneficial to the children most at risk, at least with
regard to improving physical health, school attendance, and
academic performance and preventing deterioration in social
behavior at school. Both situations-remaining at home and
placement in foster care-involved emotional stress for the
children, but the stress caused by the conflict and chaos in their
home environments may have had a more negative impact on the
home children than the stress that separation, movement, and
adjustment to new "parents" had on the foster children.66
These findings are especially dramatic in light of Wald's earlier bias
in favor of minimum state intervention, which was based in large part
upon his belief in the negative effects of foster care placement and the
benefits of continuity and permanence. Surprisingly, however, despite
the empirical findings that refute these assumptions, Wald's group goes
on to suggest that home placement is the better legislative decision.
According to the study, the findings are not dramatic enough to warrant
the "transfer [of] children from parents to nonparents just because the
child might do 'better,' in some aspects of development."'67 Essentially,
the authors argue, the decisions comes down to a "value choice," and
the policy concerns of family unity take preference over possible, less
than life-threatening harms to children. 8
One suggestion made by the authors as a result of the disappointing
experiences with the children left with their natural families is to redirect
65. Id (emphasis added).
66. l at 185.
67. Id. at 188.
68. Id. at 187.
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funds in the future to services aimed at the child, rather than the parent.
According to the authors:
The nature and extent of these children's problems raise
significant questions about current means of intervention. All
courts and child welfare agencies assume that the purpose of
intervention in abuse and neglect cases is to protect the child.
However, the focus of intervention services in the majority of
cases is on the parent. Unless the child exhibits significant
behavioral problems, most agencies do not evaluate the child's
academic or social development. The majority of children do not
receive any services aimed at promoting their social develop-
ment.69
Based on these observations, the study recommends several changes in
intervention, including "full developmental assessments" for children
targeted by the system for home intervention or foster care, "[c]oun-
seling [and] support services ... focused on the child as well as the
parents," possible inclusion of family therapy, and "alternative support
systems" such as extended-day school programs or surrogate sibling
programs."
Several shortcomings of the study bear mention. First, the amount
of funds expended in support of the home placement children is not
typical of available resources in most communities. As the authors point
out, "[t]he legislature ... provided the experimental counties with a
substantial amount of money to be used for services to the families of
the children left at home. The services were designed to minimize the
need for removal and to protect children left in their homes."71 And
as explained, even with these funds, foster care children still fared better
than those children left in the home. Second, the money constraints
faced by the study also led to a necessarily small sample size and a
corresponding inability to make broad generalizations about all children,
or even the "average" child.72 This is true even though the authors
note that, because of legislative support, this study was as well-funded
as any before its time and any that might be expected in the future.73
Third, as best explained in the study:
[The] analysis also was complicated by the fact that the develop-
mental status of the home and foster children differed somewhat
69. Id. at 192.
70. Id. at 194.
71. Id. at 4.
72. Id. at 181.
73. Id. at 182.
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at the time of oui initial interviews, which took place after the
children had been in foster care for several months. Since there
was relatively little change in the overall well-being of the
majority of children during the two-year period, the reasons for
the initial differences are crucial for policy analysis. ... [We
cannot know whether they were attributable to random variation,
to differences in the children prior to intervention, or to an initial
positive impact of foster care.74
Finally, the study only looked at children in the five to ten year-old age
group. The authors speculate that, due to the absence of parental
attachment, younger children will likely benefit even more from
separation.' This assumption, however, is not supported by data, and
appears to be based on the general principles set forth by the Goldstein
group, Wald, and the other minimum interventionists in their earlier
writings. The study's authors state that "[q]uick removal of younger
children would minimize the negative impact of the home environment,
which probably has a greater impact the longer the child is in it.' 76
Those who oppose the minimum interventionist arguments would likely
wonder why this same rationale does not apply to older children who
continue to suffer the impact of a harmful home environment.
This probable disagreement on the relative negative impact of home
placement points to the most significant shortcoming of the study, but
one for which its designers should probably not bear responsibility. The
study does not consider the arguments of the "pure" minimum
interventionists (including a younger Wald), who maintain that any state
intervention is harmful in all but the most severe circumstances. 77
Wald and his co-authors appear to assume without question that, in
those cases where the child remains in the home, the state should direct
extensive resources to the child and the family. But ultimately, this
overlooks the question of the harm done to the family unit by state
intervention and intrusion. If Wald has indeed given up his support for
the extremes of state intervention, he has done so without explanation.
One is left to guess why the concerns of parental autonomy, cultural
diversity, and family privacy are no longer relevant.
As mentioned in Section II, supra, such a study, designed to
determine the negative effects of minimal state intervention, appears to
74. Id.
75. IM. at 191.
76. Id.
77. Wald, supra note 3, at 1000.
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be, by definition, impossible. The very presence of those conducting the
study goes against the minimum interventionist model, where the family
is to be left entirely to its own methods of dealing with problems and
conflicts. Thus, there appears no way to target and study those children
who are not identified under the narrow abuse and neglect standards
proposed by the minimum interventionists. As best, one can imagine a
study designed to measure juvenile delinquency, recidivism, juvenile
health problems, and other indicators of childhood difficulties in the
region assigned a narrow statutory definition, but the results of such a
study would be speculative at best. With these thoughts in mind, it
seems wise to explore the best ways to minimize such unavoidable
limitations in the development of policy.
III. POLICY CHOICES IN THE VOID OF EMPIRICAL DATA
As a starting point, it seems that the views of Wald, Burt, the
Goldstein group, and Garrison concerning the importance of parental
authority and family autonomy carry significant weight. These
assumptions, as noted by Garrison, are grounded not only in other areas
of family law, but also in constitutional principles.78 Because of their
broad support, it seems reasonable that these principles should be the
baseline from which our policies begin. Of course, as each of the
authors discussed above agrees, the child's welfare is always the most
important factor. As we have seen, within this framework, the debate
centers around the question, "What is the least detrimental alternative?"
For minimum interventionists, the privacy/autonomy concerns are
thought to complement the child's welfare, and are believed to play a
major role in providing an environment that is "least detrimental." For
those who disagree with the minimum interventionists, autonomy and
privacy may be valid concerns, but they are usually trumped by overall
concerns about the child's best interests. This difference is, of course,
attributable to the level of importance that one ascribes to the role of
family autonomy in the creation of a good environment for the child.
The suggestion, however, that any state contact with a family harms
children (because it invades privacy and destroys the child's trust in the
parents) is wholly unsupported, even by the Wald study. This casts
doubt on the theories of the "pure" minimum interventionists who
would withhold state involvement with the family in all but the most
severe abuse and neglect cases. Although the Wald study favors
78. Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking, supra note 8, at 1769-70.
[Vol. 79:517
FAMILY VALUES AND CHILD WELFARE
placement in the home of the natural parent(s), the study's invocation
of the importance of continuity is based on those same assumptions that
earlier led him to support only the most minimal of state interventions.
However, as explained in Part II, supra, Wald himself no longer accepts
the position that the state should refrain from contact with the family
even when the abuse or neglect fails to reach the level of severity
necessary for removal. The broad pronouncements for an absence of
state interference, made by the extreme minimum interventionists like
the Goldstein group, place the unidentified child who falls outside the
narrow statutory net in an extremely vulnerable position. Furthermore,
as previously discussed, such a proposition (by its nature) can never be
tested.
Recognizing the impossibility of empirically verifying the pure
minimum interventionist theory, we should choose, instead, to develop
standards that sanction the appropriate, measured use of state interven-
tion, while keeping the virtues of family privacy and parental autonomy
in focus. As modeled, at least primitively, in the Wald study, the
intervention must be commensurate with the magnitude of the abuse.
There should be various levels of intervention that fall between the
extremes of state silence and child removal from the home. However,
as the 1975 Wald article, the Goldstein group, and particularly the
Juvenile Justice Standards Project all make clear, the danger accompany-
ing state intervention is that important value choices and differences in
child-rearing methods will-through ignorance or prejudice-be overrun
and destroyed by the state. The ABA Project even includes a specific
standard relating to cultural differences, with this comment:
Given the cultural pluralism and diversity of childrearing
practices in our society, it is essential that any system authorizing
coercive state involvement in childrearing fully take those
differences into account. Moreover, failure to recognize that
children can develop adequately in a range of environments and
with different types of parenting may lead to intervention that
disturbs a healthful situation for the child.79
In order to ensure respect for this diversity, we must find creative
ways to provide state support in homes where the child's welfare calls
for limited invasion of family privacy and parental autonomy. This will
necessarily be a difficult task, and in our majoritarian culture it will be
easy for us, either purposefully or by ignorance and oversight, to destroy
values that are alien to us but that do no harm, and may very well do
79. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, comment to § 1.4, at 44.
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much good, to the child. One possible solution is to ensure that state
workers who provide assistance to the family be of the same ethnicity
or cultural heritage as the family. Perhaps community groups could be
enlisted to work in tandem with the state, providing protection for the
values of the community and giving necessary input and feedback to
those conducting state intervention. These thoughts were alluded to in
the comments to the ABA Standards:
[T]his standard [for the maintenance of diversity] requires
that a child's need for cultural identity and continuity of cultural
heritage be recognized whenever intervention is necessary. Every
effort should be made to preserve such continuities if a child
must be removed from the home or when a family is required to
accept casework supervision. 0
Whatever the solution, it is clear that, as we develop policies of
intervention with families where warranted by sufficient abuse and
neglect, we must put much effort into overcoming our biases and
respecting differences that exist wholly apart from the issues of abuse
and neglect.
Without question, we are faced with a dilemma in the formulation
of our policy. Even if we understand the concerns of autonomy, privacy,
and diversity, and even if we recognize the overriding concern for the
welfare of the child, history has shown that we are making policy
blindly. We have no persuasive empirical data to support our various
suppositions (Wald being the closest attempt), and given the magnitude
of the effort needed to conduct such studies, it is doubtful that any
private group or state-funded study will adequately undertake the
comprehensive task. Yet we continue to insist, as evidenced in our
propensity to pronounce what is best for the child, that we have some
reason to believe that our prescriptions (be they minimum intervention-
ist or otherwise) are correct. The problem of abuse and neglect,
however, does not seem lessened by our efforts to date. Perhaps part
of this appearance of knowledgeable policymaking is attributable to the
demands made by the "consumers" of our policy. It may be difficult for
us to "sell" public policy when we are not certain if that policy will
work. The public wants to know what will happen when we institute a
particular child welfare policy. Guaranteed results are what the public
craves. Thus, we create the illusion of knowledge and refrain from
policymaking choices that might expose our ignorance.
80. Id.
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We need a new framework for making these policy decisions that
recognizes the difficulties inherent in gathering information and that
admits a certain amount of indeterminacy, at least at the outset. We
must move from a willingness to accept the current "fad" and challenge
ourselves to address the problem creatively. One way to go about this
is to institute policies that are "self-checking." In other words, control
groups should be set up within the policy framework, and the various
levels of intervention should be measured over time. Instead of
conducting small, limited studies, we should create policy that contains
internal mechanisms to evaluate its own success or failure. In this way,
the policy itself becomes a broad empirical study of the effects of
various child welfare policies. This framework might operate in similar
fashion to new medical advances, where novel drugs or surgeries are
tested and compared to a control group receiving the old treatment.
Such a framework will require the incorporation of a research methodol-
ogy that may be foreign to our typical policymaking. For instance, in
order to evaluate various options, our policy choices must be assigned
to children and families with a degree of randomness. As one text on
social science methodology explains:
The essence of true experimentation is that some people are
treated differently than other people and that randomization
determines who gets which treatment. This has sometimes been
thought to conflict directly with the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of equal protection. However, virtually all scholarly
analysis and case law has concluded that "if the proposed
research is not otherwise constitutionally impermissible, random
assignment of research subjects, with limited exceptions, should
not be considered to violate equal protection."
81
It is not the purpose of this Article to attempt to suggest a research
or policy design which might maximize our knowledge and best inform
our subsequent policy alterations. However, one can imagine a broad-
81. JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 61-62 (1985) (citation omitted). According to the authors:
For many purposes, the "ideal" research design in social science is the "true"
experiment. The true experiment is defined by the random assignment of subjects
either to an experimental (or treatment) group or to one or more comparison (or
control) groups that do not receive the treatment under investigation. Random
assignment means that each subject has an equal probability of being assigned to
each group. In other words, in a true experiment, the researcher controls the
independent variable and deliberately creates variation within it, rather than
measuring variation that occurs naturally (as in correlational designs).
Id. at 59.
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based policy, similar to Wald's study, that provides for various levels of
intervention (possibly ranging from no intervention to extensive
intervention) and that is conducted over an extensive period of time. To
test the theories of the minimum interventionists and their detractors,
the policy might experiment with various definitions of abuse and
neglect and with differing levels of interventions assigned to those
definitional categories. To test the extreme minimum interventionist
view, over a long period of time, one might even suggest that children
whose families initially fall under a broad abuse and neglect category be
silently identified by the state, left with their families during their
formative years with no interventions, and (only after reaching
adulthood) be approached for the purposes of comparison with those
persons whose families received intervention. Again, such a policy may
be difficult to reconcile with our notions of fairness and equal protection
and may be difficult to explain to the public. But if we truly have no
way to know which of our policies are best, and if those experts who
influence our policy do not agree on very basic predictions of outcome,
then we must be prepared to face the indeterminacy and try to find
answers. It is through these self-checking mechanisms that we have the
greatest hope of developing the most appropriate guidelines and the
truly "least detrimental alternatives" for our children.
In developing a self-checking policy, standards should be developed
that give concrete guidelines to those authorities who make decisions
regarding services in the home, foster care, and ultimately, termination
of parental rights. As Monahan and Walker explain, the validity of a
research design is only as good as its methodology.' And the gather-
ing of information in a proper way is central to good methodology.3
Therefore, those officials chosen to determine the appropriate disposi-
tion of each child's case should not have unfettered discretion. Indeed,
unless it is a specific part of the policy's research-based goals, such
officials should have virtually no discretion. The guidelines, as we
develop them, must be based on our best attempts to match the level of
abuse and neglect with the appropriate intervention. It is only when
officials follow these guidelines, and the results are evaluated, that we
will be able to adjust the interventions accordingly. If we choose to
direct part of the study towards measuring the effectiveness of official
discretion in these cases, then we must be clear that this is part of our
82. Id. at 45-48.
83. Id
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policy design. Each piece of the policy must be developed with the
ultimate goal of reevaluating and adjusting the policy as time provides
valuable information.
IV. CONCLUSION
As Marsha Garrison explains in her article, our policy-making efforts
can never give the assurance of success. The significant variables
inherent in the nature of families and children, and the imperfection
involved in carrying out any policy which requires such extensive human
resources, make success a relative concept. However, if we take the best
of our psychological research and systematically test it through self-
checking policies, we should eventually be able to refine our policy to
the extent that it protects not only family autonomy, but also protects
the child.
How the balance between privacy/autonomy and child welfare should
be struck-indeed, the extent to which these concerns are interdepen-
dent or in conflict-is a matter of speculation. Each side in the battle
over minimum intervention has sought to defend its position with vague
pronouncements and psychological prescriptions. In her article on
newborns with disabilities, Janna Merrick repeats this pessimistic
outlook:
There is no check on the fantasies and conceptualizations of
those who can never test objectively their conviction(s) ... nor
is there the check of reality and feedback. Conclusive demon-
strations that their heroes' policies may often be futile or
misconceived are impossible simply because the link between
dramatic political announcements and their impact on people is
so long and so tangled.'
Perhaps through the honest recognition that our child welfare decision-
making has been and continues to be indeterminate, and through the
development of new policies that measure their own effectiveness and
are developed so that we can appropriately respond to their impact, we
will finally place a check on the myriad "fantasies and conceptualiza-
tions" that have infused our policy decisions thus far.
84. Janna C. Merrick, Conflict, Compromise, and Symbolism: The Politics of the Baby
Doe Debate, in COMPELLED COMPASSION: GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE TREATMENT
OF CRITICALLY ILL NEWBORNS 68 (Arthur L. Caplan et al. eds., 1992) (quoting MURRAY
EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964)).
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